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Health care systems are faced with the challenge of resource scarcity and have insufficient resources to
respond to all health problems and target groups simultaneously. Hence, priority setting is an inevitable
aspect of every health system. However, priority setting is complex and difficult because the process is
frequently influenced by political, institutional and managerial factors that are not considered by
conventional priority-setting tools. In a five-year EU-supported project, which started in 2006, ways of
strengthening fairness and accountability in priority setting in district health management were studied. This
review is based on a PhD thesis that aimed to analyse health care organisation and management systems, and
explore the potential and challenges of implementing Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) approach to
priority setting in Tanzania. A qualitative case study in Mbarali district formed the basis of exploring the
sociopolitical and institutional contexts within which health care decision making takes place. The study also
explores how the A4R intervention was shaped, enabled and constrained by the contexts. Key informant
interviews were conducted. Relevant documents were also gathered and group priority-setting processes in the
district were observed. The study revealed that, despite the obvious national rhetoric on decentralisation,
actual practice in the district involved little community participation. The assumption that devolution to local
government promotes transparency, accountability and community participation, is far from reality. The
study also found that while the A4R approach was perceived to be helpful in strengthening transparency,
accountability and stakeholder engagement, integrating the innovation into the district health system was
challenging. This study underscores the idea that greater involvement and accountability among local actors
may increase the legitimacy and fairness of priority-setting decisions. A broader and more detailed analysis of
health system elements, and socio-cultural context is imperative in fostering sustainability. Additionally, the
study stresses the need to deal with power asymmetries among various actors in priority-setting contexts.
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H
ealth care systems are facedwith the challenge of
resource scarcity and have insufficient resources
to respond to all health problems and target
groups simultaneously. Health care competes for re-
sources, along with other services, such as education,
water, food, just to mention a few. Hence, priority setting
is an inevitable aspect of every health system (1). Priority
setting, sometimes called rationing or resource allocation,
has been defined as the distribution of resources (e.g.
money, clinicians’ time, beds, drugs) among competing
interests such as institutions, programmes, people/pa-
tients, services and diseases (23) and is arguably one of
the most important health policy issues of our time (46).
Loughlin (7) defined priority setting as the process by
which decisions are made as to how to allocate health
service resources ethically. In this study, priority setting is
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decide on the distribution of limited health care resources
among competing programmes or patients.
The challenge of priority setting is relevant in both
developing and developed countries. Developed coun-
tries’ challenges are mainly caused by ageing populations,
expensive medical equipment and increasing public
demand (8). However, developing countries’ challenges
are due to many factors, such as the growing gap between
basic health needs and available resources to satisfy them,
the lack of reliable information, few systematic and
formal processes for decision making, multiple obstacles
to implementation such as inadequately developed social
sectors, weak institutions and marked social inequalities
(910, 6).
A number of approaches to priority setting that are
grounded in many disciplines have been suggested to
support actual priority setting. Each approach presents
an alternative idea of what a good and successful
priority-setting process should consider (see Table 1).
While approaches described above are relevant to
priority setting, none of the approaches provide a
comprehensive vision of priority setting. Priority setting
is complex and difficult because the process is frequently
influenced by political, institutional and managerial
factors that are not considered by priority setting tools,
such as burden of disease, cost-effectiveness or Disability
Adjusted Life Years (DALYS). At its core, priority setting
involves choices among the full range of competing
values. Values often conflict and people disagree about
which values to include and how to balance them (11).
Daniels (12) identified four key problems that face
decision makers in the context of scarce resources:
1. The fairness/best outcome problem: should one give
all people a fair chance at some benefit, or should
one favour producing the best outcome with limited
resources?
2. The priorities problem: how much priority should
one give to the most vulnerable or worst-off
individuals or groups?
3. The aggregation problem: when should one allow an
aggregation of modest benefits to larger numbers of
people to outweigh more significant benefits to
fewer people?
4. The democracy problem: when must we rely on a
fair democratic process as the only way to determine
what constitutes a fair priority-setting outcome?
It is evident that priority setting decisions often go
beyond weighing options of varying efficiency, effective-
ness and other factors. These decisions sometimes involve
trade-offs which may lead to different outcomes for
different populations. Discipline-specific approaches,
which focus on a single value, are inadequate to resolve
disagreements about how to decide among competing
values in setting priorities.
Accountability for reasonableness: a theoretical
framework for fair priority-setting process
In the absence of agreement about which values should
ground priority setting decisions, there has been a shift in
focus away from principles, towards the process of
priority setting. Klein and Williams (6), for example,
stressed the importance of getting the institutional setting
for the debate right, suggesting that the right process will
produce socially acceptable answers and this is the best
that can be hoped for. Norman Daniels and James Sabin
(13) proposed a framework for institutional decision
making, which they call ‘Accountability for Reasonable-
ness’. Central to the theory is the acceptance that people
may justifiably disagree on what reasons are relevant to
consider when priorities are set. To narrow the scope of
controversy, A4R relies on ‘fair deliberative procedures
that yield a range of acceptable answers’. The A4R
framework consists of four conditions (see Table 2).
In 2008, when I began my PhD studies, there had been
little research on how decision-making bodies in Tanza-
nia deliberate on and make actual priority-setting deci-
sions in the health sector. Little attention had been paid
to examining the institutional conditions within which
priority-setting decisions are made, i.e. what are the
formal and informal rules governing priority-setting
decisions at the district level in the health sector in
Tanzania? Equally important, while the Accountability
for Reasonableness framework has surfaced as a guide to
achieving a fair and legitimate priority-setting process,
our understanding of the processes and mechanisms that
determine its degree of success in the achievement of
fairness and legitimacy remains largely an open question.
Given the growing popularity of the Accountability for
Reasonableness framework to priority setting, it is
imperative that one understands what works, what does
not work and why and under what circumstances. One
must understand the mechanisms that trigger changes as
well as the contextual factors that facilitate or constrain
the implementation of the framework.
Table 1. Discipline-speciﬁc approaches to priority setting
and their key values
Discipline Key values
Evidence-based medicine Effectiveness
Health economics Efficiency and equity
Philosophical approaches Justice
Political science approaches Democracy
Legal approaches Reasonableness
Stephen O. Maluka
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just priority setting in the health care system of Tanzania.
In addition, the findings contribute at least to two more
comprehensive scientific debates: firstly, they contribute
to the debate about the legitimacy of decision making
outcomes by not focusing on the outcomes but on the
process itself. They give information about the enabling
and constraining factors of legitimacy on the basis of
interviews of the participants. Secondly, they challenge
the Accountability for Reasonability by confronting it
with a new and exceptional set of data from a non-
Western country.
Context, study design and methods
The study was conducted in Mbarali District in the
Mbeya region of Tanzania. Mbarali District was selected
by the REACT project as it was a typical rural district in
Tanzania. Like other districts in Tanzania, the structure
of the health system in Mbarali District has been
decentralised. At the district level, the Council Health
Management Team (CHMT)
1 was formed with the remit
of planning and budgeting for activities needed to
manage, control, coordinate and support all health
services in the district on a year-to-year basis. To ensure
that the district health plans are in line with the national
strategies in health, in 2000 the Ministry of Health
developed the National Package of Essential Health
Interventions as a way of ensuring that the highest
priority services are fully supported. Burden of disease,
efficiency, effectiveness and equity were the main princi-
ples guiding the selection of the priority areas. Based on
these principles, six broad priority areas were identified:
reproductive and child health; communicable disease
control; non-communicable disease control; treatment
of other common disease of local priorities within the
district; community health promotion and disease pre-
vention; and management support.
Based on this national framework, all districts produce
an annual Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP)
that incorporates all activities of the District Health
Services and all sources of funding at the council level
(government funds, locally generated funds, local donor
funds etc.). However, it is imperative to note that the
national framework does not completely deprive the
districts, health facilities and the communities of the
authority to set priorities, but it provides them with a
framework within which to set their priorities.
The CCHP is approved by the Council Health Services
Board (CHSB) that consists of community representa-
tives, officers from other departments and representatives
from the private sector. The final plan is approved at the
Full Council Meeting. The Regional Secretariat (Regional
Health Management Team) approves the CCHP and
forwards it to national level. The Prime Minister’s
Office-Regional Administration and Local Government
(PMO-RALG), together with the Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare (MOHSW), assesses the CCHPs and must
give its final approval before funds can be disbursed to the
Local Government Authorities.
The REACT project in Tanzania
In 2006, researchers from many institutions (the Primary
Health Care Institute, the Institute of Development
Studies, the University of Dar es Salaam and the
National Institute for Medical Research in Tanzania, in
collaboration with research institutions from Europe)
asked whether Accountability for Reasonableness, with
its emphasis on openness, democratic process and
deliberation, could be relevant in low-income countries
with its different cultural traditions and limited resources.
These researchers teamed with decision makers and
Table 2. Four conditions of the A4R (modiﬁed from Daniels & Sabin (13); Daniels (21))
Relevance The rationales for priority-setting decisions must be based on evidence, reasons and principles that
fair-minded people can agree are relevant to meeting health care needs fairly under reasonable
resource constraints.
Publicity Priority-setting decisions, and the grounds for making them, must be publicly accessible through
various forms of active communication outreach. Transparency should open decisions and their
rationales to scrutiny by all those affected by them, not just the members of the decision-making
group.
Appeals and revision There must be a mechanism for challenge, including the processes for revising decisions and
policies in response to new evidence, individual considerations and as lessons are learnt from
experience.
Enforcement/leadership and
public regulation
Local systems and leaders must ensure that the above three conditions are met.
1The CHMT consists of: the District Medical Officer (chairperson),
District Nursing Officer, District Laboratory Technician, District
Health Officer, District Pharmacist, District Dental Officer and
District Health Secretary (secretary to the team). Other co-opted
members of the CHMT may include: Reproductive and Child
Health Coordinator, Tuberculosis and Leprosy Coordinator,
Malaria Focal Person, Aids Coordinator and Cold Chain
Operator who are invited in the CHMT meetings as the need arises.
Opportunities, challenges and the way forward
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Priority Setting for Trust in Health Systems’ (REACT) in
Mbarali District in Tanzania.
The REACT project aimed at testing the application
and effects of the Accountability for Reasonableness
framework. A preliminary phase of the implementation
of the Accountability for Reasonableness framework in
the district began in 2006, involving gathering baseline
data, consultation and planning. The full application of
Accountability for Reasonableness began in 2008. How-
ever, the actual implementation of the Accountability for
Reasonableness intervention fell short of the initial plan.
A delay in funding disbursements delayed part of the
implementation process. With time, and as circumstances
dictated, the plan to monitor and evaluate service
domains such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, emergency obste-
tric care and generalised care were dropped, and the focus
remained merely on monitoring the priority-setting
process and management changes within the CHMT
and at the district hospital.
The project applied Accountability for Reasonableness
through participatory and inter-disciplinary action re-
search design. The application of Accountability for
Reasonableness includes: describing existing priority-
setting practices in the district, evaluating the description
using Accountability for Reasonableness and implement-
ing improvement strategies in a continuous process to
address gaps in Accountability for Reasonableness con-
ditions (14).
To meet its goals, the REACT intervention employed
three overlapping strategies: (1) active collaboration with
district health decision makers, (2) sensitisation work-
shops with stakeholders and (3) the presence of a project
focal person in the district to facilitate the implementa-
tion process.
I joined the REACT project as an associated PhD
research student. I became an independent researcher
during the entire period of the project implementation
while maintaining a close link with the Action Research
Team and other institutions participating in the imple-
mentation of the project. In addition to the baseline and
project implementation data, I gathered other data
relevant to my research questions. Therefore, this study
partly consists of investigation of its own, with the aim of
examining existing organisational and health care man-
agement systems at the district level.
The overall study design
The study adopted a qualitative case study methodology,
i.e. an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context (15). The study
was designed and implemented in two phases: the base-
line study and the project implementation study. The first
phase aimed to document the actual priority-setting
practices in Mbarali district. The second phase aimed
to document the experiences of implementing the A4R
approach in Mbarali district, Tanzania. The data ana-
lysed in this article are an outcome of both phases of the
accompanying evaluation research.
Sampling and data collection techniques
To cover a wide range of views of different cadres, the
study used purposive sampling techniques to select key
informants. Participants were purposefully selected by
virtue of the positions they held either in the district
administrative office, in the CHMT, the health facilities,
or in the community (see Table 3 for a list of respon-
dents). Interviews with key informants were carried out
from October 2006 to February 2007, and between June
and August 2008. Additional interviews on the imple-
mentation of the Accountability for Reasonableness
intervention were conducted between January and Feb-
ruary 2010. Walt and Gilson’s 1994 framework for health
policy analysis and the Accountability for Reasonable-
ness framework were used as guides for developing
interview questions. Planning meetings were observed
by the REACT project focal person to get more insight
into the planning and priority-setting processes. Observa-
tion of the planning meetings provided information about
the actual participants and the information being used as
well as the power dynamics. The documents reviewed
included: the Comprehensive Council Health Planning
Guidelines, the National Package of Essential Health
Interventions in Tanzania, guidelines for the Establish-
ment of Council Health Boards and Committees, dis-
tricts’ annual implementation reports and minutes of the
CHMT and published and unpublished articles and
reports on the priority-setting process in Tanzania as
well as REACT project implementation documents
(reports, minutes).
Data were classified and organised according to key
themes, concepts and emergent patterns (16). The analysis
Table 3. Categories of respondents
Number
interviewed
Designation and responsibility Phase 1 Phase 2
1 Members of CHMT 10 7
2 Local government officials 6 2
3 Members of user committees and boards 8 3
4 Member of NGOs (advocacy group) 2 1
5 Private service providers/faith-based
organisations
2
6 Knowledgeable community members 3
7 Heads of a health facility (health centres) 2
8 Health workers at the district hospital 5
Total 31 20
Stephen O. Maluka
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manual was developed based on the research questions.
Second, the transcripts of each interview were read
through and responses were identified to the main
questions raised by the study. Data were coded to initial
themes andwere then sorted and grouped together so that
they were more precise, complete and generalisable (17).
As patterns of meaning emerged, similarities and differ-
ences were identified. Finally, data were summarised and
synthesised retaining, as much as possible, key terms,
phrases and expressions of the respondents. After this
analysis, data were triangulated to allow comparison
across sources and different categories of stakeholders.
The careful and systematic process of analysis and
reflection served to ensure analytical rigour (18).
Main findings
In what follows, findings from the baseline and A4R
implementation experience study are presented. While
findings are presented as discrete sections, they should
not be viewed as mutually exclusive issues because there is
overlap between them.
Who sets health care priorities in Tanzania?
The priority-setting process has been devolved to the
district and health-facility level. Identification of prio-
rities has to begin at the grassroots, with district-level
monitoring of adherence to budget ceilings as well as to
national policy requirements on core issues. Ideally, the
process should result in health facilities (health centres
and dispensaries) and community representatives provid-
ing input to district priority setting. However, as the
priority-setting process was studied, it was observed that
this was not the case. Health boards and committees had
little impact on the planning and priority-setting process.
Consequently, priority setting for health at the district-
level depended heavily on the group dynamics within the
CHMT rather than other actors.
Interviews with members of user committees and
boards revealed that they had recently been established
in the district and did not seem to have played a major
role in determining district health priorities. As stated by
one member of a user committee:
We are in the community and know many problems
that occur here. Therefore our voices should be
heard, but this does not happen. (interview with a
member of CHSB)
Poor attendance of public meetings, lack of interest and
education, lack of monetary gain, cultural barriers and
suspicion were some of the reasons given for this.
Furthermore, priority setting in the district often started
late that made it hard to conduct meaningful participa-
tory planning. The fact that funds were earmarked for
certain purposes was viewed as a problem, as were
unexpected budget cuts and irregular budgetary remit-
tances to the district.
What influences the selection of priorities at the
district level in Tanzania?
Two main factors influence priority setting at the district
level. The most common influence mentioned was
national-level priority, followed by district-level chal-
lenges. Ideally, planning guidelines that come from the
national government require that interventions in each
priority area be selected on the basis of magnitude,
severity, feasibility and cost. The actual allocation of
resources has to be based on budget ceilings, as specified
in the National Basket Grant guidelines. However, inter-
views with district health managers, and analysis of field
notes revealed that CHMT members use projections
based on previous plans. So, the plan was based largely
on what was funded the previous year, with some minor
adjustments for demographic or political factors. The use
of epidemiological or cost-effectiveness evidence tends to
be only a small component of the decision:
... The process lacks accurate information which is
useful in guiding priority setting... Information on
morbidity and mortality is largely inadequate and
not reliable. (interview with members of the CHMT)
The political contexts in which the CHMT operates also
influence priority-setting decisions. These include both
nationwide political decisions and politics at the district
level. The priorities of the national government influence
the priorities that the CHMT gives to particular areas of
health policy. Many CHMT members indicated that,
while some of their priorities came directly from the
districts, in situations where district-level priorities con-
flict with national priorities, the national priorities take
precedence:
When identifying priorities we usually have district
data along with instructions from the Ministry.
What we do is trying and compares [sic] problems
identified at the national level with those which we
at the district level have identified as priorities.
National priorities which are similar to district
problems are given first priority... However, even
though we identify our own district priorities at the
end of the day we must observe the national
priorities. (interview with members of the CHMT)
Furthermore, a minority of members of the CHMT who
were interviewed pointed out that lobbying, professional
experience and donors had influence in the priority-
setting process. Fig. 1 illustrates various factors that
influence priority-setting decisions at the district level.
Which institutional factors influence the district level
priority-setting process?
A number of institutional and organisational factors
influenced the district-level planning and priority-setting
Opportunities, challenges and the way forward
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responsibilities and relationships between the levels of
local government and health committees and boards. The
planning guidelines were not clear in explaining how
power relations should work between the various bodies
created by the councils. For example, the CHSB did not
have an automatic mechanism for collaboration with
other bodies such as the Hospital Governing Committee.
As a result, problems of mutual concern were not
discussed and solved.
Second, there appeared to be limited capacity of the
CHSB to oversee and scrutinise district health plans and
priorities. It was indicated that members of the CHSB
had received no formal training on planning, budgeting
and the prioritisation process to enable them to perform
their duties. In addition, for quite a long time, the CHSB
had not held meetings due to limited funds. In most cases,
district health plans and reports were submitted to the
Full Council, without first being scrutinised by members
of the CHSB, as required by the planning guidelines.
Furthermore, the district health plans were not scruti-
nised properly in the Full Council meetings. Although
CCHPs were tabled at the Full Council meetings, local
councillors appeared to approve them without an ade-
quate understanding of their implications:
At the Full Council meetings, although all members
are involved, in my experience, there are many
people who do not understand the issues which
are discussed there because most health issues
discussed are not understood by non-medical per-
sonnel...they just vote to accept the resolution
without a thorough understanding. You may find
that the resolution was passed by all, but in reality it
was a decision proposed by one person due to his/
her influence because others don’t understand
health-related issues properly. (interview with a
councillor).
According to some respondents, this was due to insuffi-
cient time allocation for Full Council meetings to enable
councillors to read and understand all the items in the
district health plans before approval. Some respondents
also felt that because most of the members of the Full
Council are politicians, they had insufficient knowledge
of health care priority setting. Thus, although district
health plans and budgets were made, supervision of, and
adherence to these was not a priority. Both health
workers and the general public had no mechanism to
hold district health managers accountable.
Whose voice was heard in the priority-setting
process and how?
A review of how the budgeting process was undertaken
showed an unequal distribution of power between the
various actors involved in the planning and priority-
setting process. All stakeholders interviewed at district
level felt themselves powerless to influence the amount of
funding coming to them from the central government. It
was evident that the national government had more
power over the purse strings than the bottom level,
despite the popular policy claim of bottom-up planning
and budgeting.
Power asymmetries were manifest even between the
CHMT and planning team members. Findings from
interviews indicate that power asymmetries within the
CHMT and the planning team were most clearly
exemplified in terms of the degree of authority they
exercised, and the varying amount of planning informa-
tion to which they had access. There was also evidence
that the managerial position of the District Medical
Officer (DMO), District Planning Officer (DPLO) and
the District Treasurer (DT) gave them the power to set
the agenda, provide technical advice and control the
priority-setting process in the district. The DMO was
thought to have had the final authority in the actual
decision-making process.
Power imbalances were also reflected in the differences
in the granted preparation time and access to the
available planning information and guidelines. Clear
power differences were also revealed between district
health professionals (public) and representatives from the
private sector and faith-based organisations (FBOs).
Access to the planning guidelines appears to have been
Fig. 1. Factors inﬂuencing CHMT’s priority-setting decisions: Source (19).
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Planning guidelines were kept in the DMOs office and
were sent to the planning meetings the same day. Many
members of the planning team, particularly those from
the private sector and NGOs had no time to review the
planning guidelines and information before the planning
meetings. Consequently, participation by representatives
from FBOs, NGOs and the private sector was minimal,
and they expressed that their views were hardly incorpo-
rated in the final CCHP.
What were stakeholders’ perceptions of the
accountability for reasonableness framework?
The picture of the relevance of the A4R framework
emerging from the respondents was, overall, a positive
one. First, all respondents shared the opinion that
involving multiple stakeholders would ensure that a
wide range of relevant values and principles were taken
into account and thus would improve the fairness,
transparency and legitimacy of the process. Second, all
respondents recognised that transparency has the poten-
tial for enhancing the democratic process by helping
members of the community learn how to allocate health
care resources thoughtfully and fairly. Furthermore, most
respondents shared the view that a formal appeals
mechanism would provide opportunities for people to
express their dissatisfaction with the decisions taken.
When asked about district health plans and budgets
both before and after the Accountability for Reason-
ableness intervention was introduced, respondents were
overwhelmingly receptive to the change. The planning
and priority-setting processes were now perceived as
more participatory and transparent:
I think there are very big changes. In the 2008
planning year, the CHMT sat alone in identifying
district priorities. After the start of the REACT
project, it was deemed necessary to widen the scope
and involve many more stakeholders in the process
of preparing the district health plan. Last year 2009,
we sent letters to health facilities requesting their
committees to prepare their priorities and submit to
the CHMT. (interview with a member of CHMT)
With regards to publicity, it was evident that district
health priorities had become readily accessible to the
members of the CHMTand hospital workers. The district
priorities were communicated to programme leaders and
other hospital staff through the staff meetings. Priorities
were also translated into Kiswahili (the national lan-
guage) and were pinned on the notice board at the district
hospital, health facilities and ward offices:
I would say there are significant changes. Starting
from 2009 we have seen hospital priorities displayed
on notice boards and in offices. In the past, even the
content of the district health plan was not usually
known. You would just be told that there was going
to be a seminar or training but you would never
know what the plans were and whether they were
implemented or not. (interview with health worker)
When they were finally asked about changes in power
asymmetries within the CHMT, respondents were also
receptive to the change dynamics. A vast majority of
CHMT members believed that their involvement in
planning and priority setting had increased over the
past 2 years. The CHMT members reported that they
were now able to appeal against DMO decisions:
As days pass by there are gradual changes. In the
past very few people dominated the meetings. But
currently there is room for other members to air
their opinions. (interview with a member of CHMT)
The REACT project has opened our eyes. We have
now gained confidence and we are able to argue
firmly in front of the chairperson. (interview with a
CHMT member)
It was observed in the 2009/2010 planning and budgeting
process that members were given the chance to raise
issues and engage in discussion, although the chairperson
appeared to continue to dominate the discussion and
have influence on the final outcome. All this amounts to
an increased awareness of the need to prioritise explicitly
in view of the many demands on limited resources.
How was the A4R intervention shaped, enabled and
constrained by contextual factors?
A number of factors positively or negatively influenced
the implementation of the A4R conditions in the plan-
ning and management of district health services. The
presence of participatory structures under the decentra-
lisation framework appeared to be the main factor that
facilitated the adoption and implementation of the A4R
intervention in the district. The decentralisation process
meant that there was already a commitment from top
politicians to devolve power, authority and accountability
to the districts.Whilst national health policy documents
were important, in most cases local contextual factors
also appeared to facilitate the implementation process. It
was evident that the desire of the CHMT to engage
different stakeholders, and listen to their views and
expectations of the priority-setting process, influenced
the application of the A4R conditions. The CHMT
members invested a considerable amount of effort and
resources in identifying the relevant internal and external
stakeholders, and to involve them in the planning and
priority-setting process. Before the start of the A4R
intervention in the district, pre-planning meetings for
developing district health plans involved only seven core
CHMT members, but this number was increased to about
18, including a coordinating person from NGOs, the
District Planning Officer (DPLO) and the Community
Development Officer. Most recently, representatives from
Opportunities, challenges and the way forward
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disabled began to attend the annual priority-setting
meeting.
Additionally, the importance of having a project focal
person and the Action Research Team dedicated to the
development and implementation of a fair and explicit
approach to priority setting became evident in the
district. The collaborative efforts between researchers
and district health managers were seen by many CHMT
members as the way to build the people’s confidence that
this project really was about benefiting the district. The
fact that the Primary Health Care Institute (PHCI) had
established a long-working relationship with the study
district facilitated the adoption and implementation of
the intervention. Furthermore, frequent meetings be-
tween the researchers and district health decision makers
seemed to have increased the level of trust, and facilitated
receptivity to the adoption and implementation of the
Accountability for Reasonableness innovation.
However, while some significant progress was made to
involve multiple stakeholders and disseminate priorities
to health workers and the public, a number of contextual
factors appeared to constrain the full implementation of
the A4R approach. First, the existing structures at the
grassroots level (such as village council meetings, village
general assemblies and health facility governing commit-
tees) that could be used to steer stakeholder engagement
were not functioning well due to lack of incentives and
low level of awareness of their roles and responsibilities.
The CHMT’s efforts to implement the A4R approach
to priority setting were also stymied by the delay in the
disbursement of funds by the central government.
Furthermore, the CHMT members felt that interference
from higher authorities hindered efforts to implement a
fair and transparent priority-setting approach. One
respondent remarked:
Many responsibilities and instructions from higher
administrative levels also affect our desire to imple-
ment a transparent and fair priority-setting process.
Sometimes things are brought to you and you are
told that it must be included in the plan and if it is
not there the plan wouldn’t be accepted at higher
levels. (interview with a member of the CHMT)
Planning guidelines imposed by the national government
were also frequently mentioned by CHMT members as
barriers to stakeholder involvement in the planning
process. Many CHMT members felt that there were too
many constraints tied to the national basket system that
prohibited the CHMT from spending above its budget
allocation. They stated that the system often determined
how to spend the money and how much could be spent
on certain items or expenditures. For example, one
CHMT member explained the constraints placed on the
districts thus:
Some of the items in the guidelines hinder us from
doing what we like. For instance, the guidelines
prescribe the percentage of resources, which should
be allocated to each priority. In effect, a lot of
money is allotted to priorities that are not very
critical in our district, while priorities that are of
great importance to the district get insufficient
funding. So, there should be flexibility, as far as
resource allocation is concerned. (interview with a
member of the CHMT)
Furthermore, the low level of public awareness and lack
of appeals culture were barriers to achieving explicitly fair
approaches to priority setting in their context. Fig. 2
summarises the contextual factors that facilitated and/or
constrained the implementation of Accountability for
Reasonableness.
Discussion
This study revealed that, despite the indisputable national
rhetoric on decentralisation, practice in the district
involved little community participation. Official govern-
ment documents clearly state that the planning and
priority-setting process in the context of decentralisation
would be done in line with the principles of public
participation, democracy, transparency and accountabil-
ity at all levels from the national level to the community
level. Emphasis is placed on devolving power and
resources to the community level and, in particular, on
the role of the health care committees and boards. It is
evident that decentralisation does not automatically
provide adequate space for community engagement.
In the first place, the content of the annual district
health plans seemed to be largely dictated by national
priorities, despite the emphasis on decentralisation of
decision making and budgeting. Secondly, the high level
of conditionality associated with local government fund-
ing gave the CHMT little room to alter funding alloca-
tions, especially in the recurrent budgets. However,
national guidelines could be an important tool for
effective decentralisation. Given the weakness of account-
ability mechanisms at the district and grassroots levels,
guidance is needed on the criteria to be debated in the
priority setting and resource-allocation processes. Decen-
tralisation may become problematic if local decision
making on how to use resources is made without
guidance on citizen rights and local-level responsibilities.
Nevertheless, it is important that such guidance does not
impose new outside criteria, but both operationalises and
balances established planning criteria.
In addition, grassroots participation appears to have
little impact on the planning and priority-setting pro-
cesses. District health plans are the products of a few
members of the CHMT, with community bodies and
private partners operating at best as a rubber stamp to
approve the decisions taken. User committees, boards
Stephen O. Maluka
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decentralised health care planning and priority-setting
processes. One could argue that decentralisation has both
‘supply’ and ‘demand’ sides. Demand for accountability
by citizens requires education, mobilisation and demo-
cratisation at the grassroots.
Furthermore, this study found that A4Rwas perceived
as an important approach for improving priority setting
and health service delivery. A4R helps to operationalise
the concept of fairness at the district level. Traditionally,
health workers, patients and the public have been
excluded from planning and priority setting. The focus
on the process of priority setting, rather than priorities, is
an innovation that responds to the long-standing calls for
an increased focus on process and context to enhance the
delivery of quality services (20).
However, while the A4R approach to priority setting
was perceived to be relevant in strengthening transpar-
ency, accountability, stakeholder engagement and fair-
ness, integrating the innovation into the current district
health systems was challenging. National guidelines,
budget ceilings, interference from higher authorities,
unreliable and untimely disbursement of funds, inactive
grassroots participatory structures, and low awareness of
health staff, stakeholders and communities were the
major obstacles to the implementation of the Account-
ability for Reasonableness intervention.
Implications of the findings to the accountability for
reasonableness approach to priority setting
The results suggest that three important points should be
taken into account. First, there is need for greater
engagement of affected communities in relevant deci-
sion-making processes than currently exists. Although
Daniels (21) acknowledged that stakeholder participation
may improve deliberation about complicated matters, he
believed that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition of Accountability for Reasonableness. While
Daniels’ view, that the mere fact of public involvement in
priority-setting ensures neither true representation nor a
better quality of decision-making process, is persuasive,
without greater opportunities for engagement of affected
communities, it is uncertain how the priority-setting
process can enhance legitimacy. Stakeholders affected
by the decisions should have an input in determining how
priorities are ranked.
Whereas Norman Daniels is correct that, even with
stakeholder participation, aprocess not aimed at account-
ability for reasonableness will not achieve legitimacy (21),
it would be important for the relevance condition aiming
for inclusion of stakeholders in the mechanism for
achieving compromise. There is, therefore, an urgent
need to broaden the involvement of stakeholders from
the demand side, making sure also that representatives of
vulnerable groups are present and heard. Having a wide
range of stakeholders participating in deliberation helps
include the full range of relevant arguments, enhances
legitimacy and facilitates the implementation of the
decisions made. Furthermore, to make the most of
channels of stakeholder influence, deliberate efforts to
sensitise the public, health care staff, ward and village
development committees and village health governing
committees to the importance of priority-setting using
Accountability for Reasonableness is necessary.
Second, the findings underline the need to recognise
and deal with power asymmetries among various actors
in the priority-setting process. More attention needs to be
paid to issues of difference and the challenges of
inclusion. It was evident that while priority setting was
meant to be participatory, this was not the case. In
practice, most of the district health plans were products
of a few members of the CHMT, with private partners
and community bodies at best operating as a rubber
stamp for decisions taken without their input. The
findings suggest that simply establishing institutional
arrangements of participatory planning, priority setting
and governance  in the absence of prior awareness and
without the strong capacity for exercising countervailing
power against persisting ‘rules of the game’  will not
result in greater responsiveness to community needs and
priorities. Rather, the best-intentioned mechanisms for
Fig. 2. Contextual factors that facilitated and constrained the change process.
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be dominated by the local elite.
This study reinforces the findings of an earlier study in
high-income countries that advocated the need to add the
empowerment condition in the Accountability for Rea-
sonableness framework (22). The empowerment condi-
tion requires that steps should be taken to optimise
effective stakeholder participation and minimise the
impact of power differences in decision making (22). In
this case, empowerment of user committees and boards
enables them to be pro-active, to suggest solutions to
local authorities and to insist on decisions being made
and implemented. One of the tools in empowering boards
and committees is the provision of good information,
more so if they are involved in its collection. Well-
informed members of boards and committees will be in a
better position to make sound and informed decisions,
and to participate effectively in the implementation of
priorities. Another way to empowerment could be to
engage the committees and boards in identifying not only
community needs but also the available local resources,
and in working out acceptable solutions (23).
Third, this study suggests that attempts to establish fair
priority-setting mechanisms have to recognise constraints
in the local contexts of sociopolitical conditions and
traditions. In this case, the A4R framework should be
implementedwith flexibility to allow for the local context.
Since Daniels and Sabin developed A4R in the context of
US private care organisations, their fourth condition
focused on public or voluntary regulation that is the
mostobviousmeansofenforcement.InMbaralidistrict,it
was evident that the enforcement mechanism needed togo
beyond avoluntary or public regulation of the process, to
ensure that the relevance, publicity and appeals/revisions
conditionsaremet. WhileTanzania hasadoptedanumber
of policies, rules and regulations that enforce transpar-
ency, accountability and stakeholder participation, for
almost two decades little has been done at the district and
grassroots levels to translate the same into practice. This
thesis, therefore, re-emphasises the need to build strong
and effective organisational leadership and oversight that
ensures the implementation and sustainability of the A4R
approach. Leadership can be described as a process
whereby an individual influences a group of individuals
to achieve a common goal. Good leadership is about
providing direction to, and gaining commitment from
partners and staff, and thereby facilitating change. In
building the leadership capacity of district health care
leaders, there is a need to go beyond the skills of medical
practitioners to the skills of teamwork, advocacy, negotia-
tion, lobbying, data management, governance and ac-
countability to achieve results that are fundamental in
makingadistricthealthsystemeffective.Theseskillscould
be acquired through a variety of means, including coach-
ing, mentoring and action learning.
Furthermore, because the A4R approach emphasises
inclusiveness, participatory planning and priority setting,
the approach could be seen as threatening to some
members. The implementation of the A4R approach
thus requires strong support from oversight institutions.
At present, an increasing range of oversight institutions,
such as the Full Council, CHSB and Facility Governing
Committees and Boards, are too weak to hold district
health managers accountable. There is an urgent need to
build the capacity of these institutions through training
and sensitisation to enable them carry out the range of
functions required for effective district health system
governance, including overseeing the implementation of
agreed health priorities. The capacity-building plan
would, amongst other things, entail refresher courses on
the roles and functions of boards and committees,
management and governance, participatory planning
and priority setting processes and an overview of the
health services within the local authority.
Conclusion
This study aimed to analyse health care organisation and
management systems in Tanzania, and explore the
potential and challenges of implementing the A4R
approach to priority setting. The study has revealed
that, despite the indisputable national rhetoric on decen-
tralisation, practice in the district involved ineffective and
limited participation. The findings of this study demon-
strate clearly that the setting up of health priority-setting
structures alone is unlikely to lead to significant improve-
ments unless accompanied by transparency and account-
ability mechanisms aimed at ensuring the effective use of
resources. In this regard, one could rightly argue that the
participatory priority-setting approach that has no sta-
keholder participation, and minimises the impact of
power differences in the decision-making context, is less
likely to bring about strong and effective health systems.
Additionally, the study has shown that the road to
strengthening fairness, transparency and accountability
in resource-poor settings is neither straight nor smooth.
There is a need for a broader and more detailed analysis
of health system elements and sociocultural contexts, and
such research can help promote better prediction of the
effects of the innovation and pinpoint stakeholders’
concerns, thereby illuminating areas requiring special
attention and fostering sustainability. Equally important,
the study encourages the intensification of social net-
works between decision makers and researchers to build
sound working relationships that foster the adoption and
integration of innovations in health care settings.
Furthermore, the study suggests a need for building
strong and effective organisational leadership as an
important factor in the successful implementation and
sustainability of the A4R approach. In building the
leadership capacity of district health care leaders, there
Stephen O. Maluka
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to promote the skills of planning, negotiation, lobbying,
data management, governance and accountability to
make district health systems effective.
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